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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
llO..:\UD OF EDUC.ATION OF 
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT, a Statutory corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent~ Case No. 
vs. 
HEX H. COX and WILMINA 
COX, his wife, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
10023 
ST .. A.TEl\IENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
This originally was an action by which the plaintiff 
sought to take appellant's property by way of an al-
leged contract, OR in the alternative, by way of con-
demnation proceedings. Said action having been filed 
in two separate causes of action, respectively. This 
court previously affirmed a Default Judgment against 
the defendant, Rex H. Cox, (Case #9844) granted by 
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the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. Whereupon, the 
defendant, Rex H. Cox, sought an Order compelling 
plaintiff to pay over to the defendant the amount of 
the Judgment rendered in the above mentioned case, 
and the lower court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
permitted new evidence to be admitted, enlarged upon 
the scope of the Judgment in some respects, and cut 
the Judgment in half. It is from this new Order that 
the defendant, Rex H. Cox, is now again before this 
court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted a Default Judgment on 
the first cause of action in the original case against both 
defendants. Both defendants moved the lower court to 
set aside said Default. The lower court, Honorable 
Merrill C. Faux, set aside the Default Judgment as 
to the Defendant "\Vilmina Cox, and denied same as to 
the Defendant Rex H. Cox. The defendant, Rex H. 
Cox, then appealed from the Order denying his motion 
to set aside the Default Judgment, this court's case 
#9844, and this court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion. Defendant Wilmina Cox's case is still pending 
in the lower court. The Defendant-Appellant, Rex H. 
Cox, moved the lower court to have plaintiff pay over 
to the defendant the amount of the Judgment rendered 
by the lower court as set forth in the Default Judgment 
and the lower court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
permitted new evidence to be admitted, enlarged, and 
changed the scope of the case, and cut the Judgment 
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in half and it is from this new Order that the Defendant-
.. \.ppellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, Rex H. Cox, seeks reversal 
ot' the lower court's Order of October 23, 1963 modify-
ing, enlarging the scope of, and diminishing the amount 
of' the Judgment, of the lower court's Default J udg-
ment heretofore rendered by the lower court on October 
5, 19ti:!. Defendant, Rex H. Cox, further seeks enforce-
ment of the J udg1nent granted on October 5, 1962 
and the granting of his motion compelling the plaintiff 
to pay over to the defendant, Rex H. Cox, the full 
amount of the original Judgment. 
STA_TEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff caused the defendants to be served 
with a copy of its Summons and Complaint on or about 
September 10, 1962. The plaintiff pleading its case in 
two causes of action: one, requesting to take defend-
ants' property by way of an alleged contract, and two, 
by means of condemnation proceedings. The Salt Lake 
County Clerk executed a default certificate on or about 
October :2, 1962. Judge Merrill C. Faux granted de-
fault judgment against both defendants on or about 
October 5, 1962 on plaintiff's first cause of action. The 
defendants were served notice of said judgment on or 
about November 9, 1962 and contacted counsel as soon 
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after as an appointment could be made. Defendants' 
counsel immediately contacted plaintiff's counsel. N e~ 
gotiations were pending for a period of approximately 
ten days between respective counsel and their respective 
clients without success. Defendants filed a Motion to 
Set Aside the Judgment as well as a 1\'Iotion and Order 
to Stay Proceedings and Stay Eexcution of Judgment 
with the lower court and plaintiff's counsel, on or about 
November 28, 1962, pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure as follows: 
1. Due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable 
neglect. 
2. That the judgment was based upon a void con~ 
tract for the reason that the san1e did not comply 
with the Statute of Frauds. 
3. That the purported contract, the subject of said 
judgment, is void or voidable for failure of con~ 
sidera tion. 
4. That the judgment is inequitable. 
The proceedings and execution of judgment being 
stayed as of that date until further order of the court. 
Defendants' motion was called up for hearing be~ 
fore the Honorable 1.\'Ierrill C. Faux on December 4, 
1962, all parties being present and being represented 
by counsel. At this time testimony was adduced by both 
sides and the lower court took the matter under advise-
ment and to see if the parties could not resolve their 
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diJl'ert·m'l's. The ruotion was further argued to the lower 
court by respective counsel and submitted for decision. 
The lower court granted the motion to set aside 
the judgtnent as to Wilmina Cox but denied same as 
to Hex II. Cox. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and u11 Order were filed and both plaintiff and defend-
ant Hex H. Cox filed respective motions to have the 
lowt:r court reconsider its Order and the court denied 
san1e. 
Au appeal \vas then taken to this court on behalf 
of this defendant, Case #9844, and Defendant Wilmina 
Cox filed her Answer to plaintiff's Complaint and 
same is still pending trial in the lower court. This court 
affirmed the Default Judgment against the defendant, 
Hex H. Cox, in Case #9844. This defendant, Rex H. 
Cox, upon remittitur of the record in said Case #9844, 
demanded of the plaintiff the amount of the Judgment 
heretofore granted. Plaintiff neglected, failed and/ or 
refused to comply with the terms of said previous De-
fault Judgment. The plaintiff then withdrew its war-
rant for $4!1,831.60 on file with the lower court, pursuant 
to an Order of the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, 
such withdrawal being without notice to or the knowl-
edge and/or consent of this defendant. (R. 70). 
Plaintiff moved the lower court for an Order con-
Yeying to the plaintiff an undivided one-half interest 
in the property described in the Complaint in the origi-
nal action to include any interest defendant, Rex H. 
Cox, may have in the property described by metes and 
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bounds and/ or as described conforming to fence lines, 
offering to tender its warrant in one-half of the sum 
of the original Judgment in full payment of an alleged 
undivided one-half interest in the defendant, Rex I-I. 
Cox, in and to the property described in said complaint. 
Plaintiff further sought to reform the legal description 
by said motion (R. 71-2). 
Plaintiff by this motion (R. 70-71 seeks to reduce 
the amount of the Judgment (R. 8-9) and its Notice 
of Judgment (R. 11) and to alter and enlarge the 
description as set out in its Complaint (R. 1-4) and 
its Judgment (R. 8-9) and to create a different owner-
ship than as alleged in its Complaint and Judgment. 
Defendant, Rex H. Cox, n1oved the lower court 
for an Order compelling the plaintiff to pay over to 
the defendant-appellant the full amount of the Judg-
ment ( R. 8-9 and 73-7 4) . 
At the time the respective above mentioned motions 
were argued on October 17, 1963, the lower court per-
mitted by its Order the previous Judgment to be altered 
in the following respects, namely: 
(a) Permitted new evidence to be admitted, over 
the objections of this defendant. (Exhibit 
P-1). 
(b) Created a joint tenancy in the property in 
question when, in fact, the record is completely 
void of any evidence of such. 
(c) Created an undivided one-half interest in and 
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to the property in question on behalf of Rex 
H. Cox. 
(d) Created an undivided one-half interest in de-
fendant Wilmina Cox even though she was 
not a party to said Motion nor a party of this 
Appeal or the previous Appeal. 
(e) Reduced the amount of the Judgment by one-
half. 
(f) Denied defendant's Inotion to enforce the pre-
vious Judgment on behalf of the defendant, 
Rex H. Cox. 
(g) Conveyed an undivided one-half interest in 
and to the property in question rather than 
only the equity of this defendant, Rex H. 
Cox. 
The above Order was entered as of the 23rd day 
of October, 1963 over the strenuous objection of this 
defendant and it is from this Order opening up, ,ad-
mitting evidence and an1ending the Judgment of the 
previous case that this defendant appeals to this court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OPEN-
IXG CP, AD~IITTING NEW EVIDENCE, 
AXD r\.:\IENDING THE JUDGMENT PRE-
YIO.USL1~ ~lADE BY THE LOWER COURT 
AXD AFFIR~IED BY THE UTAH SUPREJ.VIE 
COURT. 
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The Plaintiff-Respondent by its Motion (R. 71-
72) attempted to enlarge the description in its com-
plaint ( R. 1-4) and in its Judgment ( R. 8-9) , to 
create an undivided one-half interest in both defendants , 
(even though the defendant 'Vilmina Cox was not a 
party to said Motion or previous Appeal), requested 
a conveyance of an undivided one-half interest in an 
enlarged description, (even though the record is void 
of any mention of how the property was held) , and 
to reduce the Judgment by one-half. The lower court 
permitted all of this in its Order of October 23, 1963 
with the exception of the enlargement of the descrip-
tion. 
In order to properly review the matter now before 
this Court, we must look at the status of the October 5, 
1962 Judgment as it was prior to the Order amending 
same entered October 23, 1963. The plaintiff obtained 
a Default Judgment from the lower court, Judge Mer-
rill C. Faux presiding, on October 5, 1962 on its first 
cause of action, i.e., on an alleged contract. Both de-
fendants moved to have the Default set aside. The 
lower court set aside same as to the defendant Wilmina 
Cox and refused to vacate the Default Judgment as 
to this appealing defendant, Rex H. Cox. The Utah 
Supreme Court, on appeal by Rex H. Cox from the 
Order refusing to set the Default aside as to him, af-
firmed the Judgment as to him, and the record was 
returned to the lower court. 
This Court must keep in mind that the Judgment 
rendered on October 5, 1962, was solely of the making 
10 
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ot' the plaintiff and not of the defendant and even 
though Lhis defendant does not necessarily agree with 
it, he is bound by it as the Supreme Court on the pre-
Yious appeal (Case #9844) affirmed same. 
\Ve also invite the court's attention to the fact that 
at no time did the plaintiff object to the Judgment 
either at the time it was taken by the plaintiff on 
October 5, 1962, nor at the time the lower court made 
its Order on January 9, 1963, nor at the time the 
Supreme Court affirmed said Judgment against this 
defendant, nor did the plaintiff cross appeal at the 
tin1e this defendant appealed in case #9844. The first 
attack which the plaintiff has made on said Judgment 
was on October 10, 1963. Even the lower court in mak-
ing its Order dated January 9, 1963, stated, "It is 
difficult to see where the end result of my ruling will 
be." (R. 54). 
Rule 59 (e) U.R.C.P. states that a motion to alter 
or amend the Judgment shall be served not later than 
ten days after entry of the Judgment. Under said rule 
the plaintiff has not made a timely motion to amend 
or modify the Judgment. In fact, the plaintiff has waited 
until an Appeal has been made by the defendant, Rex 
H. Cox, a decision by the Supreme Court affirming the 
Judgment, and after the case has been remitted to the 
lower court for enforcement. 
A Judgment or Decree should be in plain and in-
telligible language, and the property which is the subject 
of Judgment should be described with sufficient cer-
11 
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tainty to leave its identity free from doubt. Smith v. 
Phillips~ 6 U. 378, 23 P. 932; City of Springville v. 
Holley~ 6 U. 378, 23 P. 933. Judgments should be 
read, construed, and applied as other writings are, and 
if in light of pleadings and whole record they are cer-
tain, they should be enforced. Snow v. West~ 37 U. 
528, 110 P. 52. The Judgment must be in conformity 
with the pleadings and proof. Miller v. Johnson~ 43 U. 
468, 134 P. 1017, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 294. Certainly in 
the instant case, the Judgment is in conformity with 
the pleadings and there is no ambiguity as to the nature 
of same, nothing is left for conjecture in connection 
with the Judgment and the Judgment conforms to our 
rules, is valid, and should be enforced as originally 
granted. 
Under Rule 58A U.R.C.P. a Judgment is com-
plete and is deemed entered for all purposes when it 
is signed and filed, and not when notice is received by 
the parties. In Re Bundy~s Estate~ 121 U. 299, 241 
P .2d 462. The Judgment in question was entered on 
October 5, 1962, was stayed until the appeal was af-
firmed, and remitted, and then became operative again. 
The plaintiff cannot attempt to have the Judgment 
altered or amended under our Rule 60 (b) inasmuch 
as there has been no mistake, inadvertence, excusable 
neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or etc., as 
this Judgment is of the plaintiff's own making. The 
plaintiff cannot avail itself of Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P. 
as none of the grounds apply. Neither can the plaintiff 
12 
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attempt to cmne under Rule 60 (a) U.R.C.P. and 
allege that a clerical 1nistake has been made inasmuch 
as the .Judgment conforms to the pleadings and a nunc 
pro tunc order cannot properly be used to revive the time 
t'or taking a required step in a legal proceeding after 
the statutory time for doing so had elapsed. Kettner 
t'. Snow, 13 U. (2d) 382, 375 P.2d 28. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the plain-
tiff by its l\Iotion filed in the lower court on October 
10, 1963, is attempting to attack the previously rendered 
valid Judgment, which was affirmed by the Utah Su-
preme Court (Case #9844), "directly" or "collaterally." 
Courts have announced various rules, tests, and gauges 
in determining whether a particular attack on a J udg-
ment is "direct" or "collateral" and a splendid summary 
of these Yarious rules is outlined in the case of I ntermill 
t' . .. Yash, 94 U. 271, 75 P.2d 161. Without citing all of 
the references, we would like to set forth some of the 
tests shown in the above cited case, namely: 
(I) "If the course taken to attack the decree is 
one provided by law, that is, follows a 
method prescribed by law to annul or void 
the decree, the attack is said to be direct; 
otherwise, it is said to be collateral." 
(2) "If the proceeding is for the purpose of 
setting aside or modifying the Judgment, 
the attack is said to be direct ; if the aim of 
the action is other relief than the vacating 
of the judgment, the attack is said to be 
collateral.'' 
13 
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( 3) "If the voidness or invalidity of the judg-
ment appears from the record thereof, the 
attack may be made collaterally, if based 
upon matters dehors the record, it must be 
made directly." 
( 4) "Remedies pursued in the proceedings 
wherein the judgment is rendered are direct 
attacks; otherwise, they are looked upon as 
collateral." 
( 5) "Allegations in the pleadings may be ex-
amined to determine the nature and purpose 
of the attack." 
( 6) "The parties to the proceeding may be im-
portant, because in direct attack, the parties 
to the judgment who would be affected 
thereby must be made parties, as their rights 
under the judgment are directly involved." 
(7) "An action in equity, brought to annul the 
judgment or set aside or vacate the same, 
alleging proper equitable grounds therefor, 
whether by plaintiff in his complaint, or by 
cross-complaint or counterclaim by defend-
ant in a proper proceeding, is a direct attack 
on the judgment." 
The above cited case further differentiates between 
"direct" attack and "collateral" attack as follows: 
"From an examination of the cases, there ap-
pears some confusion in the use of the terms 
"direct attack" and "collateral attack" due to 
the use of the same terms in different contexts. 
To differentiate clearlv, one must have in mind, 
not the terms used, but the reason underlying 
14 
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the differentiation. The terms "direct" and "col-
lateral," as used in reference to attacks on judg-
ments, apply to the purpose of, or the m~t~od 
employed in, the attack, and not as descriptive 
of the assault itself. The term "direct attack" 
means a proceeding brought, instituted, or main-
tained directly for the purpose, that is, with the 
direct and primary objective of modifying, set-
ting aside, canceling or vacating, or enjoining 
the enforcement of the judgment. The term 
"collateral attack" means the questioning of the 
validity of a judgment in a collateral proceed-
ing; that is, a proceeding other than the one in 
which the judgment is entered, and which is not 
brought, instituted or maintained for the ex-
press purpose of modifying, setting aside, can-
celing, or enjoining the execution of the judg-
ment. It is a denial of, or questioning the validity 
of, a judgment, when the judgment is or be-
comes involved in the cause, only incidentally 
and collaterally, and its enforcement or validity 
is not the primary issue in or purpose of the pro-
ceeding." 
In attempting to apply the plaintiff's motion under date 
of October 10, 1963, seeking to amend the Judgment of 
October 5, 1962, and the Court's Order amending said 
Judgment under date of October 23, 1963, it might be 
said that plaintiff's motion falls within the provision of 
some of the above seven cited gauges inasmuch as it is at-
tempting to modify the Judgment. Therefore, the at-
tack would appear to be direct, also, the paintiff's motion 
is based upon matters dehors the record which under 
the above gauges would place his motion as a direct 
attack upon the Judgment. Yet, on the other hand, 
15 
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the Judgment is being cut in half and is, therefore, seek-
ing relief other than what the terms of the Judgment 
are, therefore, the attack may be said to be collateral. 
It appears from reviewing this motion that the 
plaintiff is attempting to annul or void the decree in 
some respects and to enlarge it in other respects there-
fore trying both a "direct" and a "collateral" attack 
simultaneously and according to our statutes, rules, 
and the general law both attempts must fail. 
The general rule of law is that an application to 
amend a Judgment must be made within the time 
prescribed by statute. Furthermore, laches may defeat 
the application. Laches or undue delay in making ap-
plication for the amendment of a judgment alone is 
grounds for denial of the application, particularly 
where rights have vested under the judgment as entered 
which would be disturbed by its alteration, as is the 
case here. 49 C.J.S. paragraph 252. In the case at bar, 
as previously stated, the plaintiff has not complained 
of said Judgment until its October 10, 1963 motion 
which is in excess of one year after the original J udg-
ment was rendered and after the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed same. The general rule of law cited in 49 
C.J.S. Paragraph 401 states that a Judgment which 
is not void is not subject to collateral attack. Further-
more, a Judgment rendered by a court having juris-
diction of the parties and the subject rna tter, unless 
reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not 
open to contradiction or impeachment, in respect of its 
validity, verity, or binding effect, by parties or privies, 
16 
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in any collateral action or proceeding. The Judgment 
in the instant case meets the tests set forth in this rule. 
The Judgment in the instant case also is res judi-
cata and the general rule of res judicata is as set forth 
in 50 C.J.S. Paragraph 592 as follows: 
"Res judicata is a rule of universal law pre-
vading every well regula ted system of j urispru-
dence, and is put on two grounds, embodied in 
various maxims of the common law; the one, 
public policy and necessity, which makes it to 
the interest of the state that there should be an 
end to litigation-interest republicae ut sit finis 
litium; the other, the hardship on the individual 
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause 
-nemo debet his ve:x:ari pro eadem causa. The 
doctrine applies and treats the final determina-
tion of the action as speaking the infallible truth 
as to the rights of the parties as to the entire 
subject of the controversy, and such controversy 
and every part of it must stand irrevocably closed 
by such determination. The sum and substance 
of the whole doctrine is that a matter once judi-
cially decided is finally decided." 
The plaintiff in this case has by technicalities of time 
and rules prevented, successfully, the defendant, Rex 
H. Cox, from filing an answer, having a hearing on 
the merits of the case and his day in court. Now the 
plaintiff wants the privilege of entering new evidence, 
wants to change and modify the decree, and wants to 
change the status and rights of the other defendant 
in an untimely motion and without joining the other 
defendant in said motion. To permit the plaintiff to 
17 
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proceed on its own Default Judgment and then after 
the Supreme Court has affirmed said Judgment, decide 
that it does not like it and wants it changed would b~ 
highly irregular and inequitable to say the least, and 
would, in effect, give no meaning to any type of J udg-
ment or Order. The plaintiff is estopped and precluded 
from relitigating the issues on the same cause of action. 
The general rule is that, where the requirements 
for res judicata are present, as in the instant case, a 
decree in equity will bar a subsequent action at law 
and a Judgment in an action at law will bar further 
action in an equity proceeding. Therefore, the plaintiff 
should be barred from amending the previous judgment 
whether "directly" or "collaterally." 50 C.J.S. Para-
graph 609. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in opening up, admitting new 
evidence and amending the judgment previously made 
by the trial court which had been affirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The trial court had jurisdiction of the 
parties and the subject matter and the Judgment was 
not reversed or annulled but affirmed. Therefore, same 
is not subject to "direct" or "collateral" attack and the 
Judgment is res judicata. The Order entered under 
date of October 23, 1963, by the trial court should be 
set aside, the case remanded to the District Court, and 
the Judgment of October 5, 1962, enforced, and the 
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pluintitl' compelled to comply with said Judgment of 
OctoLl'r 5, 1 UH:! by granting of the motion of the de-
fendant, Rex H. Cox, filed with the trial court on 
October 11, 1963. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAHL AND SAGERS 
17 East Center Street 
Midvale, Utah 
Everett E. Dahl 
Victor G. Sagers 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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